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the charter and by-laws to determine the parties' intent, thus apply-
ing the procedure of Guillory to large corporations."
An examination of the corporate charter and by-laws need not
be decisive in determining whether an individual is an executive
officer. However, the practice should not be abandoned by the courts
as appears to have been done in Berry. The issue of executive officer
status has its origin in the insurance contract and the court is only
called upon to determine the intent of the parties. If one of the parties
has taken action to express that intent-for example, by designating
executive officers in the corporate charter and by-laws-the court
should utilize this in deciding the issue. However, if there are no
executive officers designated only then should the cburt examine the
responsibilities of the "managerial employees" and their relationship
to the corporate officers. Taken in the context of the entire clause,"
the term "executive officer" seems to relate to an individual easily
associated with the corporate entity and having broad overall author-
ity in corporate affairs. Thus the duties and responsibilities of these
"managerial employees" should resemble those of a "corporate offi-
cer" as closely as possible. His responsibilities should include partici-
pation in the formulation of company policy and his authority should
extend company wide. However, this analysis should be used to de-
termine, not defeat, the intent of the contracting parties.
Danny Lirette
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND UNEXPLAINED INJURIES TO ANESTHETIZED
PATIENTS
Plaintiff sustained unexplained burn injuries to his thigh and
reproductive organs while under the effects of anesthesia for an elbow
operation. Suit was brought against the hospital and the surgeon as
individual defendants. Not knowing the cause of these injuries, plain-
tiff urged that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. In
21. In Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So. 2d 125 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971), the last case involving the issue, the court apparently did not regard the
charter and by-laws as in Guillory and Berry, holding that a carpenter and a superin-
tendent of construction were not executive officers because they had no managerial
responsibility for the affairs of the corporation generally. This process seems to have
been employed by other jurisdictions in at least two instances. Graven v. Pass, 355
F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1966) (foreman of underground mining is not an executive officer);
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Warhurst, 336 F. Supp. 1190 (W.D. Ala. 1971) (depart-
ment foreman not an executive officer).
22. See text at note 6 supra.
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overruling the surgeon's exception of no cause of action,' the Louis-
iana supreme court held that as the plaintiff received unexplained
injuries while under the exclusive custody of the several defendants,
a cause of action was stated against the surgeon. In so holding the
court implied that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
McCann v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973).
The only question before the court was whether the plaintiff's
petition stated a cause of action. For an affirmative answer, the plain-
tiff's allegations, when supported by the evidence, must justify a
conclusion that the defendant is subject to liability.2 However, this
plaintiff was unable to determine the cause of his injuries and had
to rely only on the fact that the injuries occurred. Situations of this
type are generally encountered after presentation of all the evidence.
It is then that the question lends itself to a discussion of res ipsa
loquitur and its possible application. :' Although the instant case had
not reached this stage, the court discussed the prospective availabil-
ity of res ipsa loquitur in support of its holding that the petition
stated a cause of action.' This suggests that the court would be willing
1. The district court overruled the exception of no cause of action and the court
of appeal affirmed. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 258 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972).
2. See Burns v. Genovese, 254 La. 237, 223 So. 2d 160 (1969); Louisiana State Bd.
of Med. Exam. v. England, 252 La. 1000, 215 So. 2d 640 (1968).
3. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259, 261 (La. 1973); King v.
King, 253 La. 270, 278, 217 So. 2d 395, 397 (1968); Plunkett v. United Elec. Serv., 214
La. 145, 158, 36 So. 2d 704, 708 (1948). See also Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof
By Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 92 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D,
comment a (1965).
4. "This negligence action presents, on its pleadings, a single issue: the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to untoward injury in the course of medical
treatment. This question was presented but not resolved in Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury
Indemnity Co., 225 La. 618, 73 So. 2d 781 (1954); the court concluding that 'the
applicability of that rule was not of grave importance' in view of the facts. We now
hold that, under the limited circumstances outlined by the pleadings in this action,
the doctrine does apply.
[The ultimate question is whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies when all the facts alleged in the petition are accepted as true.
"Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence. Its applicability is normally
determined at the conclusion of the trial. The rule applies when the facts shown
suggest the negligence of the defendant as the most plausible explanation of the in-
jury. ...
... Res Ipsa Loquitur is, of course, irrelevant when a body of direct evidence is
available. ...
"Neither does the joinder of multiple defendants bar res ipsa loquitur. In Gerald
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to use the doctrine to support a final judgment for this plaintiff. It is
this prospect that deserves consideration.'
Res ipsa loquitur is applicable to a situation where the bare
occurrence of the accident suggests the negligence of the defendant
as the most plausible explanation.' Thus, there must be an inference
of causation as well as negligence.7 In the instant case, there is cer-
v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 204 La. 690, 16 So. 2d 233 (1943), for example, we
held the doctrine applicable to a fact structure presenting three defendants. This is
consistent with the majority of recent decisions in the nation at large." McCann v.
Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259, 260 (La. 1973).
5. A second point raised by the instant case concerns the propriety of using the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to determine the sufficiency of plaintiff's petition. It is said
that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of pleading. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof
By Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 92 (1941). However, Louisiana courts, as in the instant
case, have often talked in res ipsa loquitur language in passing on an exception of no
cause of action. Urban Land Co. v. City of Shreveport, 182 La. 978, 162 So. 747 (1935);
Bentz v. Saenger-Ehrlich Ent., 197 So. 659 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); Auzenne v. Gulf
Pub. Serv. Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
It has been suggested that using the same doctrine to pass both on the sufficiency
of the pleadings and on the evidence could lead to confusion as the criteria for deter-
mining whether the petition states a cause of action is different from the criteria for
determining if the plaintiff has prevailed on the evidence. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Proof By Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 92 (1941).
In Gerald v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 204 La. 690, 16 So. 2d 233 (1943) the
court discussed the possible application of res ipsa loquitur to the factual situation,
but made it clear in overruling an exception of no cause of action that it was not
passing on the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. This procedure has been commented
on favorably. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1943-1944
Term-Torts, 6 LA. L. REV. 204, 210 (1945).
6. King v. King, 253 La. 270, 278, 217 So. 2d 395, 397 (1968); Pilie v. National
Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 286, 158 So. 2d 162, 165 (1963); Veillon v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Proof By Inference, 4 LA. L. REV. 70 (1941); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 39, at 218 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
One of the most apt statements concerning res ipsa loquitur may be that of Bond,
C.J., dissenting in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40, 152 A. 633, 636
(Md. Ct. App. 1930): "It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more
clearly expressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It does
not represent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule.
Nowhere does it mean more than the colloquial English expression that the
facts speak for themselves .... "
7. The occurrence of the accident must not only suggest negligence, but it must
also point the finger of responsibility at the defendant. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 39, at 218 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D,
comment f (1965); Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof By Inference, 4 LA. L. REV.
70, 74 (1941); In Pilie v. National Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 301, 158 So. 2d 162, 171
(1963), (now Chief) Justice Sanders said in a concurring opinion: "For the doctrine to
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tainly an inference of negligence, but no implication as to whom the
negligence may be imputed. It is known that the plaintiff sustained
the injuries sometime during the period of his unconsciousness, either
prior or subsequent to surgery.' However, during this period he was
in various locations and in contact with a number of persons? Thus
it is difficult to conclude that the conduct of any particular person
was the cause. It is even more difficult to single out the surgeon since
he was with the plaintiff in the operating room only. However, even
if it were known that the accident occurred in the operating room the
nature of the injury affords no suggestion that the surgeon, rather
than another, was the cause."' Under these circumstances, a judg-
ment for plaintiff against the surgeon could not be based on res ipsa
loquitur without expanding the doctrine beyond its present limits.
There are, however, certain situations where the plaintiff is not
required to establish who among several defendants caused his inju-
ries. This result occurs when there is some relationship between the
defendants so as to render them joint tortfeasors or to create a
master-servant relationship." However, in the instant case, the hos-
pital and the surgeon were acting legally independent of one another,
and their joinder as defendants does not affect the causation issue.
In other situations the plaintiff may be relieved of showing which
be applicable, the circumstances shown by the evidence must be such as to warrant
an inference, not of negligence only, but of defendant's negligence."
8. The court of appeal opinion set out the known facts as follows, "In the ante-
room 1plaintiffi was given a pre-operative injection which rendered him uncon-
scious. . . . The surgeon] saw Iplaintiffi and had contact with him only during his
elbow surgery and only in the operating room. Following surgery [plaintiff] was
wheeled to the recovery room and thence to his own private room.
"When Iplaintiffl began to recover from the effects of his general anesthetic
.... [hiis father ...discovered on his left thigh a large blister, or burn like lesion
.... "McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 258 So. 2d 618, 619 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972). The injuries may have occurred in any of these areas or at points in between.
9. It would appear that instruments capable of causing burn injuries were present
in all the areas in which the injuries may have occurred. For example, hot light bulbs
were certainly present in all the areas.
10. Admittedly, the surgeon would be the most likely prospect for the cause of a
cutting injury. But these injuries were burns. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 258
So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
11. McCoid, Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7 STAN. L. REV.
480, 488 (1955). As to joint tortfeasors and res ipsa loquitur see Biondini v. Amship
Corp., 81 Cal. App. 2d 751, 185 P.2d 94 (1947); Waterbury v. Riss & Co., 169 Kan.
271, 219 P.2d 673 (1950); Shroeder v. City & County Say. Bank, 293 N.Y. 370, 57
N.E.2d 57 (1944). As to the master-servant relationship and res ipsa loquitur see Knell
v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P.2d 352 (1952); Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 226
P.2d 574 (1951).
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of several defendants caused his injuries if he can establish that all
defendants were negligent and that any one of them may have caused
his injuries.' 2 But in the present case there is no suggestion that both
the hospital and the surgeon were negligent; rather, the implication
is that there was only one wrongdoer.
In the instant case, the plaintiff was unaware of the cause of his
injuries because at the time they occurred he was under the effects
of anesthesia. Under such circumstances the plaintiff must suffer the
loss without recompense unless the defendants know and choose to
tell. This inequality in the positions of the parties may well explain
why some courts have been willing to stretch the limits of res ipsa
loquitur to allow the plaintiff a chance of recovery.' The most promi-
nent case to so use res ipsa loquitur, Ybarra v. Spangard," has been
the subject of much criticism." However, this commentary has been
12. This is a special rule announced by the California supreme court in Summers
u. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, the plaintiff was able to show
that, both defendants were negligent, in discharging their shotguns in his direction.
However, he was unable to show from whose gun came the pellet that lodged in his
eye. However, as both defendants were negligent, the court awarded the plaintiff a
recovery against both and left the defendants to work out an apportionment among
themselves.
13. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Frost v. Des Moines
Still Coll. of Osteop. & Sur., 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956); Horner v. Northern
Pac. Ben. Ass'n Hosp., 62 Wash. 2d 351, 382 P.2d 518 (1963); Beaudoin v. Watertown
Men. Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966).
Another Louisiana medical malpractice case, Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemn-
ity Co., 61 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1952), is cited as in accord with Ybarra. In
Meyer, the plaintiff sued an oral surgeon and anesthetist after a tooth was dislodged
from her mouth into a lung while being prepared for surgery. The court cited Ybarra
approvingly, but affirmed a judgment for the defendants on the ground that they had
exercised reasonable care. In atirming, the supreme court did not decide the question
of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. 225 La. 618, 73 So. 2d 781 (1954).
The situaton presented in Meyer appears to differ from Ybarra and the instant
case. First, both defendants were in control of the plaintiff when the accident occurred.
This would seem to make for a strong argument that the defendants were joint tortfea-
sors. See text at note 11 supra. Also, as the cause of the injury was known, there seems
to have been little need for the discussion of res ipsa loquitur.
14. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). In Ybarra a patient undergoing an appen-
dectomy came out of the operating room with paralysis around the shoulders. He sued
several defendants, at least two of whom were independent. The California supreme
court held that. res ipsa loquitur was applicable and allowed a recovery against all the
defendants.
15. Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L.
REV. 1043 (1962); McCoid, Negligent Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 480 (1955); Seavey, Res lpsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV.
643 (1950); Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unex-
plained Injuries to a Healthy Part of His Body?, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 1.
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aimed at the propriety of the court's use of res ipsa loquitur, rather
than the policy behind the decision.
If res ipsa loquitur is not an appropriate vehicle, what other
means could be used to allow the plaintiff a more equitable chance
of recovery? The most straightforward approach" would be to allow
this kind of patient a recovery against all who had contact with him
during the period of unconsciousness. However, each defendant
would be able to avoid liability by affirmatively establishing that he
was not the wrongdoer. While the result will be the same, res ipsa
loquitur would not be the basis, thus avoiding expansion of that
doctrine.
Requiring each defendant to establish that he was not the wrong-
doer is analogous to those cases involving injuries to passengers of
public carriers. 7 There, the plaintiff need only show that the injuries
occurred while he was under the carrier's care, and the carrier has the
burden of affirmatively establishing its lack of negligence." This form
of strict liability results from the special responsibility undertaken by
the carrier and its superior ability to ascertain the facts." In the
instant case both the surgeon and the hospital had undertaken a
similar special responsibility for the safety of the patient and a simi-
lar inequality existed as to knowledge of the facts.
Another means of allowing the plaintiff a more equitable chance
For a judicial opinion critical of the use of res ipsa loquitur in Ybarra see Talbot
v. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter Day-Saints Hospital, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
(1968) (especially the concurring opinion of Henroid, J.) But see Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1951).
16. It has been suggested that the real inquiry in this factual situation is that of
who should bear the risk of these injuries to the plaintiff. Thode, The Unconscious
Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy Part of His
Body?, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5. In that context it is nothing more than a question of
public policy.
17. This analogy has been suggested on several occasions. Thode, The Uncon-
scious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy Part
of His Body?, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §
39, at 223 (4th ed. 1971); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 643, 646-47 (1950). In Cassidy v. Minister of Health, [19511 2 K.B. 343, 360,
Denning, L.J., said "What possible difference in law, I ask, can there be between
hospital authorities who accept a patient for treatment, and railway or shipping au-
thorities who accept a passenger for carriage? None whatever."
18. See Francis v. Fitzpatrick, 89 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Carson v. Boston
Elev. Ry., 309 Mass. 32, 33 N.E.2d 701 (1941); Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1088 (C.P. 1809); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 34, at 180 (4th
ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A, comment b (1965).
19. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1970).
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of recovery would be to regard everyone coming into contact with an
anesthetized patient a "servant" of the hospital.' Since the hospital
would be vicariously liable for any negligent acts, the plaintiff would
only need to establish the negligence of someone. Classifying all per-
sonnel as servants of the hospital could best be done by statute so as
to avoid changing the general criteria for determining vicarious liabil-
ity.2' However, if the legislature fails to act, then possibly the courts
could follow the British approach which has found hospitals liable for
the negligence of a surgeon,2 an anesthetist,22 and a radiologist.2"
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff injured by an
object falling from a multistory building would normally be required
to show whose negligence allowed the object to fall. However, by
extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as suggested in the instant
case,2" plaintiff need only rely on an inference of negligence without
the customary showing of causation. Thus suit could be successfully
brought against all the residents of the building from which the object
fell. Although some factual situations may justify such a result as a
matter of public policy, there are more appropriate means, other than
res ipsa loquitur, to allow the plaintiff an equitable chance of recov-
ery.
Reginald E. Cassibry
20. At first glance it may seem unfair to make the hospital vicariously liable for
the negligence of a surgeon whose only connection with the hospital was that he used
the hospital facilities. But it has to be remembered that of the several people who may
have caused the injuries, the majority (nurses, orderlies, etc.) were employed by the
hospital and unless they could be found to be "borrowed servants" the hospital would
be vicariously liable for their negligence. W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY, § 84, at 145-46
(1964); Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 420, 431 (1973). Adding the surgeon and any one else
to the list who was not already considered a servant of the hospital would not seem to
be that great a burden. As the immediate loss will fall on the hospital's insurer, it
would be passed on to the public through increased rates.
21. The accepted criteria for determining master-servant status is the require-
ment of right of control in the master. W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY, § 84 (1964). The
hospital would have no right of control over the personnel assisting in the surgery, thus
a change would be necessary to classify those people as servants of the hospital.
22. Cassidy v. Minister of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343. But under the British
system of governmental medical services the surgeon was employed and paid by the
hospital authorities. In the instant case, the surgeon was employed and paid by the
plaintiff, which makes it more difficult to find that the surgeon was a servant of the
hospital.
23. Roe v. Minister of Health, [19541 2 Q.B. 66. But in Roe the anesthetist had
a contract for services with the hospital.
24. Gold v. Essex County Comm., [1942] 2 K.B. 293.
25. It should be noted again that the instant case was before the court on an
exception of no cause of action and the court's holding only has the effect of allowing
the case to proceed to trial.
1973]
